The Nyaya- Buddhist Debate On Perception

Dr. Vaibhav Narula — Sun, 20 Jul 2025 00:00:00 +0000

This article explores the classical Indian philosophical debate between the Nyāya and Buddhist schools on the nature of perception, specifically the distinction between indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) perception. The central issue concerns whether perception can be genuinely conceptual or whether true perception must be free from conceptual construction. The Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga argues that only non-conceptual, momentary particulars (svalakṣaṇas) are valid objects of perception, while any awareness involving universals, names, or categories belongs to the realm of inference and is thus epistemically suspect. This position challenges the Nyāya realist account, which upholds the validity of conceptual cognition as a stage of perception. Earlier, Nyāya-aligned philosophers such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Vācaspati Miśra attempted to defend conceptual perception, but their explanations were often psychologically descriptive and lacked a rigorous epistemological foundation. This article argues that Gangeśa, the founder of Navya-Nyāya, provides a more philosophically sophisticated response. He affirms the necessity of a non-predicative awareness that precedes conceptual judgment and demonstrates that successful predication presupposes prior cognition of both particulars and universals. By establishing the epistemic continuity between raw perception and conceptual cognition, Gangeśa bridges the gap left by earlier realist thinkers and offers a compelling rebuttal to Buddhist nominalism. His theory also engages with a broader philosophical concern—what modern thinkers like Wilfrid Sellars call the ‘myth of the given’—by grounding conceptual knowledge in valid non-conceptual experience. In doing so, Gangeśa vindicates Nyāya realism in the theory of perception.

Indian Journal of Ethics, Logic and Philosophy

The Nyaya- Buddhist Debate On Perception